For two reasons it seems interesting to lift the concept of Consistent Structure Realism, which was presented in the section 'Implications on the scientific realism debate', to the metaphysical level of the debate.
First, its formulation at the level of philosophy of science results in a peculiarly bipartite understanding of a reality that on one side has to comprise the observable world of visible objects, but on the other side must include the non-ontological structural world of theory as well. This construction looks expedient from the perspective of philosophy of science, however it is not truly satisfactory at a metaphysical level. Therefore it appears natural to try to unify the bipartite notion of reality by extending the de-ontologisation of the scientific regime to the visible world, thereby elevating consistent structure to the status of the unique foundation of the reality concept.
The relevance of this program is enhanced by the fact that the metaphysical realism debate similarly to its cousin in philosophy of science leans towards the search for middle positions between ontological realism and anti-realism. A generalisation of Consistent Structure Realism as a version of non-ontological realism thus might also be of genuine interest in the metaphysical context.
An attempt to use consistent structure as a foundation for reality at a metaphysical level faces a number of difficulties. The quest to overcome these difficulties in our opinion should have an invigorating effect on the course of the metaphysical realism debate and eventually might even have an effect back on the developments in physics.